Q26
Isn't belief just upbringing?
The question, at its strongest
"If I had been born in Tamil Nadu, I would almost certainly be Hindu; in Utah, a Mormon; in Riyadh, a Muslim. My reasons feel convincing to me, but a Hindu's reasons feel convincing to him. So my feeling that my reasons are good is exactly what I would have if my belief came only from my upbringing. Saying 'that's the genetic fallacy' misses the point: I'm not saying my belief is false because of where it came from — I'm saying I have no way of telling, from the inside, whether my reasons are real or just my upbringing talking."
Why people ask it
University students meet people raised in other faiths, often for the first time, and notice how much of their own belief came with their family. The question is sharper for Muslims because the Quran itself criticises people who follow their fathers' religion.
Short answer
Upbringing shapes belief strongly; the data and the Prophet (pbuh) both say so. The weak form of the objection ("where a belief came from shows it is false") is a fallacy. The strong form ("I can't tell whether my reasons are real") is serious, and it is the question al-Ghazali faced in the eleventh century: he saw that "Christian youths always grew up to be Christians, Jewish youths to be Jews and Muslim youths to be Muslims", doubted everything he had inherited, and came out with a faith he had tested. The answer is not to stop believing — the same doubt would undermine moral, political and even atheist beliefs, which are also shaped by upbringing — but to examine one's reasons. The Quran rebukes not inherited belief as such, but refusing to look at evidence because "we found our fathers" doing otherwise (2:170; 43:22–24). And most classical theologians held that the faith of someone who has not reasoned it through is still valid, though they urged people to think.
The full answer
8min read
For the heart and mind
If this question has unsettled you, you are in good company. One of the greatest theologians in Islamic history began his search exactly here. Doubt that leads to examination is not a betrayal of faith.
Owning your faith does not mean starting from zero. It means asking, of what you were given: what are my reasons now, and do they hold? Some of what you inherited may turn out to be custom rather than religion; some may turn out to be truer than you knew.
What the Quran says
The Quran criticises following fathers against evidence. "And when it is said to them, 'Follow what Allah has revealed,' they say, 'Rather, we will follow that which we found our fathers doing.' Even though their fathers understood nothing, nor were they guided?" (2:170). This is Medinan, in Sura al-Baqara, about people who held to inherited practices.
It says this happened to every prophet. "Rather, they say, 'Indeed, we found our fathers upon a religion, and we are in their footsteps [rightly] guided.' And similarly, We did not send before you any warner into a city except that its affluent said, 'Indeed, we found our fathers upon a religion, and we are, in their footsteps, following.' [Each warner] said, 'Even if I brought you better guidance than that [religion] upon which you found your fathers?'" (43:22–24), from Sura al-Zukhruf, Meccan. Ibn Kathir reads it as addressed to idolaters who "have no grounds for their belief in idolatry apart from the fact that they are imitating their fathers", making "their claim with no evidence".
What the verses criticise. Not belief that one learned from one's parents, but refusing to consider "better guidance" when it is brought (43:24). This applies to Muslims too: a Muslim who would refuse to look at evidence because "this is what my family believes" is doing what the verse describes.
An innate disposition. "[Adhere to] the fitrah of Allah upon which He has created [all] people" (30:30). Fiṭra means the original nature God gave people, which the tradition reads as an inclination toward God.
What the Prophet (pbuh) taught
The Prophet (pbuh) himself said parents shape a child's religion. "Every child is born with a true faith of Islam (i.e. to worship none but Allah Alone) and his parents convert him to Judaism or Christianity or Magianism" (Bukhārī 1385 Ṣaḥīḥ (sound); the words in brackets are the translator's). This hadith agrees with the objection that upbringing shapes belief. What it adds is a claim about what lies underneath: a natural disposition (fiṭra) that upbringing builds on or redirects. On this view, upbringing explains the differences between religions, while fiṭra explains why belief in God is so widespread.
How scholars have understood it
Al-Ghazali's story. Al-Ghazali (d. 1111) tells in al-Munqidh min al-Dalal (Deliverance from Error) that from youth he wanted to know "the true meaning of things". He writes: "I saw that Christian youths always grew up to be Christians, Jewish youths to be Jews and Muslim youths to be Muslims", and recalled the hadith that everyone is born with a sound nature (Watt, section I). He resolved to find knowledge "in which the thing known is made so manifest that no doubt clings to it". He then tested every source of knowledge — first the senses (the eye sees a star as small, though it is larger than the earth), then reason itself — and fell into doubt for "almost two months". He says the doubt ended not by an argument but by "a light which God most high cast into my breast", which restored his trust in the basic truths of reason (section II). He then examined the theologians, the philosophers, the Ismaʿilis and the Sufis in turn. His faith after this was not inherited; it was tested, and partly given back to him.
The faith of the imitator (īmān al-muqallid). Classical theologians asked whether belief held only by taqlīd (following others, without one's own reasoning) is valid. Kamil Güneş (2007) surveys the positions:
- Valid, but sinful for neglecting reasoning — the view of most Maturidi and Ashʿari theologians, and of Ibn Taymiyya (pp. 10–11).
- Valid — Abu Hanifa, Sufyan al-Thawri, Malik, al-Awzaʿi, al-Shafiʿi, Ahmad ibn Hanbal, al-Muhasibi, al-Nasafi, al-Baghdadi, al-Ghazali and al-Taftazani; al-Taftazani said nearly all jurists held it (p. 11).
- Invalid — the Muʿtazila (Qadi ʿAbd al-Jabbar), and among Ashʿaris al-Juwayni and al-Isfarayini (pp. 12–14).
- Al-Ashʿari's own view is disputed. His surviving works contain no clear statement that the imitator's faith is invalid; later authors attributed it to him, and others (al-Baghdadi, al-Taftazani) read it as referring to complete faith (pp. 14, 24–25).
So the mainstream answer is: the believer who has not reasoned is still a believer, but is urged to think. That is the opposite of "blind faith" being the ideal.
The reasoning
The weak form: the genetic fallacy. "You believe X because of your upbringing, so X is false" confuses where a belief came from with whether it is true. Philosophers describe this as conflating "the context of discovery with the context of justification" (Jong and Visala, as reported by Van Eyghen).
The strong form: religious luck. The philosopher Guy Axtell argues that because believers would probably hold opposite beliefs if raised elsewhere, exclusivist religious belief suffers from "a malignant strand of epistemic luck" (Jackson's review, NDPR). This is the objection at full strength.
Why debunking arguments "prove too much". A debunking argument tries to show that a class of beliefs was formed by a process that does not track truth (Van Eyghen). The problem with using upbringing this way: almost all our deep beliefs are shaped by upbringing. Jackson's review lists the replies: some beliefs — such as that discrimination is wrong — we rightly keep despite their cultural origin; atheism and theism are equally affected by upbringing; and the same problem hits moral, political and philosophical beliefs. Example: someone raised in a family that believes in human equality would, if raised in a different time and place, perhaps not believe it. That does not make belief in human equality unjustified. If the argument worked against religion, it would also work against the belief in equality — and against the atheist's own atheism.
What actually answers the strong form. Not the observation that everyone is affected, but checking one's reasons against ones that do not depend on upbringing: arguments that a person from any culture can examine (the existence and order of the world; the character and message of a prophet; the transmission of a scripture), and listening to the best case for other views. This is what al-Ghazali did. Limit: no one can fully step outside their upbringing; examination can reduce the role of luck, not remove it.
What science says
Belief is passed on in families. Established (for the US sample.) In a Pew survey of 1,811 pairs of US teens and their parents (2019), "Most teens share the religion of their parents", and 48% of teens said they have "all the same" religious beliefs as their parent.
Children are naturally inclined to some religious ideas. [Moderate.] Justin Barrett, a psychologist then at Oxford, argues in Born Believers (2012) that "belief in gods appears to be a naturally occurring human phenomenon": children readily detect agents, see purpose in nature (a "promiscuous teleology"), and tend to posit a creator. He distinguishes a cross-cultural "natural religion" from detailed theology, which "takes more time and effort to acquire" (as reported in BHodges's review). This does not favour any particular religion; the reviewer notes that Barrett "doesn't provide a compass" for judging between them. The book has not yet been consulted directly.
Thinking analytically does not reliably reduce belief. [Moderate.] A 2012 study in Science (Gervais and Norenzayan) reported that prompting analytic thinking reduced religious belief. A large, pre-registered, multi-site replication with 941 participants found "little to no effect on religious belief": d = 0.07, in the opposite direction, 95% CI [−0.12, 0.25] (Sanchez et al., PLOS ONE, 2017).
What this means. Upbringing strongly shapes which religion people hold; a general openness to belief in God appears early in children; and the claim that thinking carefully makes people stop believing did not hold up in this replication. None of this shows that any religion is true or false.
The strongest objection, and the reply
"I can't tell from the inside whether my reasons are real." Reply: you can test them from the outside — against the best arguments of other views, and against reasons that do not depend on where you were born. Limit: most people never do this, and for them the objection stands.
"Fiṭra is just a religious name for a cognitive bias." Reply: the research shows a natural tendency; whether it tracks something real or is a misfire is what is disputed. Van Eyghen notes the reply that belief-forming faculties can be "sensitive to something": if God exists, a faculty that leads people toward Him would be working properly. Limit: this reply works only if there are independent reasons to think God exists.
"Doesn't the Quran blame people of other faiths for following their parents?" Reply: the verses blame refusing "better guidance" when it is brought (43:24), and the Quran says no one is punished until a messenger has come (17:15). Mainstream scholars apply this to individuals the message did not truly reach (see "Are good people of other faiths saved?"). Limit: who counts as having truly received the message is something only God knows.
The range of views
- Mainstream Sunni theology — faith by taqlīd is valid, though reasoning is urged (most Ashʿaris and Maturidis; the four imams; Güneş).
- Muʿtazila, al-Juwayni, al-Isfarayini — faith without reasoning is not valid (Güneş).
- Al-Ghazali — inherited belief must be tested to become certainty (al-Munqidh).
- Axtell — exclusivist religious belief is undermined by epistemic luck.
- Critics of Axtell — the same argument undermines too much (Jackson's review).
Questions readers ask next
What does Bukhari 1385 actually say?
"Every child is born with a true faith of Islam… and his parents convert him to Judaism or Christianity or Magianism." It agrees that parents shape religion, and adds that a natural disposition lies underneath.
How did al-Ghazali get out of his doubt?
After about two months, by "a light which God most high cast into my breast" that restored his trust in reason; he then tested each school of thought in turn (al-Munqidh).
What are debunking arguments, and why do they "prove too much"?
Arguments that a belief came from an unreliable process. Used against religion because of upbringing, they would also undermine moral and political beliefs — and atheism.
Is a faith I never examined worth anything?
Most classical scholars said it is valid faith; most also said you should examine it.
How do I examine my faith?
Read the strongest case for and against it; ask which of your reasons would convince someone raised elsewhere; separate religious teaching from family custom; and talk with someone who knows the arguments well.
What is Barrett's 2012 work about?
Born Believers, a book arguing that young children are naturally inclined to believe in agents, purpose and a creator, though not in any particular religion.
Key verses
وَإِذَا قِيلَ لَهُمُ ٱتَّبِعُوا۟ مَآ أَنزَلَ ٱللَّهُ قَالُوا۟ بَلْ نَتَّبِعُ مَآ أَلْفَيْنَا عَلَيْهِ ءَابَآءَنَآ ۗ أَوَلَوْ كَانَ ءَابَآؤُهُمْ لَا يَعْقِلُونَ شَيْـًٔا وَلَا يَهْتَدُونَ١٧٠
Transliteration: wa-idhā qīla lahumu ittabiʿū mā anzala l-lahu qālū bal nattabiʿu mā alfaynā ʿalayhi ābāanā awalaw kāna ābāuhum lā yaʿqilūna shayan walā yahtadūna
And when it is said to them, "Follow what Allah has revealed," they say, "Rather, we will follow that which we found our fathers doing." Even though their fathers understood nothing, nor were they guided?
Translation: Saheeh International
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So direct your face toward the religion, inclining to truth. [Adhere to] the fitrah of Allah upon which He has created [all] people. No change should there be in the creation of Allah. That is the correct religion, but most of the people do not know. 30:30
Arabic text and transliteration
فَأَقِمْ وَجْهَكَ لِلدِّينِ حَنِيفًا ۚ فِطْرَتَ ٱللَّهِ ٱلَّتِى فَطَرَ ٱلنَّاسَ عَلَيْهَا ۚ لَا تَبْدِيلَ لِخَلْقِ ٱللَّهِ ۚ ذَٰلِكَ ٱلدِّينُ ٱلْقَيِّمُ وَلَٰكِنَّ أَكْثَرَ ٱلنَّاسِ لَا يَعْلَمُونَ
fa-aqim wajhaka lilddīni ḥanīfan fiṭ'rata l-lahi allatī faṭara l-nāsa ʿalayhā lā tabdīla likhalqi l-lahi dhālika l-dīnu l-qayimu walākinna akthara l-nāsi lā yaʿlamūna
Sources
- Saheeh International via the site's Tanzil data — 2:170, 30:30, 17:15.
- Saheeh International via legacy.quran.com — 43:22–24.
- Ibn Kathir, Tafsir (abridged English), on 43:22–24, https://surahquran.com/tafsir-english-aya-22-sora-43.html.
- Sahih al-Bukhari 1385 (sunnah.com), as read for run 2.
- W. Montgomery Watt (trans.), al-Ghazali, al-Munqidh min al-Dalal, in The Faith and Practice of al-Ghazali (1953), https://www.ghazali.org/works/watt3.htm — sections I and II.
- Kamil Güneş, "Eşʿarî'de Mukallidin İmanı", Marife 7:2 (2007), pp. 7–35, https://zenodo.org/records/3343847/files/MARIFE.2007.2-20_GUNES.pdf.
- Clinton Sanchez, Brian Sundermeier, Kenneth Gray and Robert J. Calin-Jageman, "Direct replication of Gervais & Norenzayan (2012): No evidence that analytic thinking decreases religious belief", PLOS ONE (2017), DOI 10.1371/journal.pone.0172636 — abstract via EconPapers.
- BHodges, review of Justin L. Barrett, Born Believers: The Science of Children's Religious Belief (Free Press, 2012), By Common Consent (8 March 2012), https://bycommonconsent.com/2012/03/08/review-justin-l-barrett-born-believers-the-science-of-childrens-religious-beliefs/ (the book itself not yet consulted).
- Hans Van Eyghen, "Debunking Arguments against Theistic Belief", ch. 5 in Introduction to Philosophy: Philosophy of Religion (Rebus Community), https://press.rebus.community/intro-to-phil-of-religion/chapter/debunking-arguments-against-theistic-belief/.
- Liz Jackson, review of Guy Axtell, Problems of Religious Luck (2019), Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2019.09.23 (as read for run 2).
- Pew Research Center, "10 key findings about the religious lives of U.S. teens and their parents" (10 September 2020) (as read for run 2).
- Barrett (2012)
- Sanchez et al., PLOS ONE (2017)
- Ibn Taymiyya, Darʾ (Ar.)
- al-Ghazālī, al-Munqidh (Ar./Tr.)
- Aimmah et al., Taʾdibuna (2025, Indon.)
- TDV, "Fıtrat" (Tr.)